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Abstract: In this article, I contextualise the emergence and describe the 
political processes of a grassroots mobilisation against the structural violence 
of neoliberalism in Mexico in order to suggest the necessity of re-thinking 
conjunctural analysis in a posthegemonic direction. The National Assembly 
of the Environmentally Affected (ANAA) is a nationwide network of Mexican 
communities and organisations that has operated since 2008. ANAA’s most 
notorious achievement has been the opening of a Mexican chapter at the 
Permanent People’s Tribunal, the final verdict of which established the legal 
responsibility of the Mexican State for structural violence against the Mexican 
people. My account of ANAA’s intervention in the Mexican conjuncture 
recuperates Stuart Hall’s emphasis on complexity and singularity by narrating, 
through multiple critical voices, the cultural and political conjuncture in 
which some of the most environmentally affected groups of the Mexican 
population have been able to organise and strike alliances with critical 
academic communities or socially concerned scientists. In terms of theoretical 
elaboration, I reflect on the limits of conjunctural analysis as a response to 
the deeper crisis of representation – what I call a ‘disjuncture’ – that concerns 
the scale of socioenvironmental violence in neoliberal Mexico. In order to 
think beyond issues of cultural representation, I propose to inform a situated 
practice of environmentally affected cultural studies with the posthegemonic 
turn in Latin American thinking of the political.
Keywords: Mexico, neoliberal cosmopolitanism, ANAA, technocratic 
hegemony, Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal
THE IMMEDIATE TERRAIN
On 19 September 2017 central Mexico experienced a 7.1 magnitude 
earthquake that killed 228 people in Mexico City and many more in the states 
of Chiapas, Oaxaca, Puebla and Morelos. From a geological point of view the 
earthquake was described as unusual for two main reasons: its epicentre was 
very close to the Mexican capital and it was hypothetically triggered by an 
anomalous movement, perhaps a fissure, within a tectonic plate. By contrast, 
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most earthquakes affecting central Mexico usually originate far in the Pacific 
Coast and are triggered by periodic collisions of tectonic plates. Unlike such 
more habitual earthquakes, this one was strongly felt in relatively stable areas 
to the north and south of Mexico City which are regarded as safer than the 
downtown neighbourhoods. The latter sit on top of a former lakebed and 
are therefore highly prone to amplified seismic waves, while the supposedly 
safer areas sit on top of volcanic rock and other hardened remainders of the 
region’s deep past. However disquieting these geological details might be, 
a sense of human history repeating quickly took over the narration of the 
latest seismic disaster, which happened just a couple of hours after a city-wide 
drill had been performed in commemoration of the much more devastating 
8.1 magnitude earthquake that hit Mexico on 19 September 1985. While 
the 2017 earthquake arrived abruptly, eschewing the alarm system that had 
been ceremoniously used on that very same day, the coincidence of dates 
seemed to immediately domesticate the public’s realisation of the terrifying 
vulnerability of one of the world’s most heavily populated megalopolises. 
It immediately focused our attention on questions of national ethos, unity 
versus conflict, hope versus despair, virtues versus vices of the Mexican soul. 
 The quake activated memories of the legendary ‘emergence of Mexican 
civil society’ which is conventionally dated on 19 September 1985. It 
renewed debate about continuity and change, about who and what defined 
the Mexican nation today that was not, or did not want to identify with 
the historic authoritarianism of the Mexican state. Barely a week after the 
event, the market research and political communications company Lexia 
Insights & Solutions published in its website a classification of narratives it 
found circulating in social networks.1 In one of his weekly appearances in 
the news programme Agenda pública – within a section aptly called Guerra 
de narrativas or ‘war of narratives’ – Lexia’s vice-president Claudio Flores 
described six different narratives about the meaning of the earthquake 
according to social network users.2 These were: an apocalyptic or religious 
narrative about the coming of the end of the world, a more secular narrative 
that praised spontaneous solidarity among the Mexican people in the 
immediate aftermath of the earthquake, a narrative about the role of social 
networks themselves in the citizenry’s response to the emergency, a political 
critique of the government’s actions and rescue operations, an ecological 
narrative that speculated on environmental causes of the earthquake including 
human-induced climate change and, finally, a conspiratorial narrative that 
speculated on a military intervention of the imperial North. Among all 
these narratives, the one about an exceptional kind of Mexican solidarity in 
adverse circumstances – and only in such circumstances – was given the most 
attention, followed by one about a supposedly typical Mexican humour in 
the face of death which was expressed in real time through creative videos, 
photographs and memes released into social networks. In his commentary, 
Claudio Flores presented Mexican solidarity and Mexican humour as the 
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objects of two distinct narratives which nevertheless overlapped with the 
political narrative about the good and the bad, or the heroes and villains 
of the earthquake emergency. Naturally, the villains were the government 
officials, whereas voluntary rescue workers and even rescue animals were the 
heroes. Dismissing the plausibility of any connection between the earthquake 
and ecological issues such as global warming or clandestine geo-engineering, 
Lexia’s commentary focused on raising the question of whether Mexicans 
would take the shock of disaster as an opportunity to at last redefine ourselves 
culturally and politically in relation to a dysfunctional state apparatus, or 
whether we would be satisfied with once again temporarily performing as 
angels and heroes, only to then go back to our usual sleepiness, resignation 
or comfort. 
 In the age of algorithms and broken political narratives, a socially-minded 
private enterprise such as Lexia – which basically sells sentiment analysis to 
powerful transnational brands in agribusiness, pharmaceuticals, banking and 
so forth – seemed to be performing the task that in other times and places 
would have been performed by cultural theorists, namely, that of diagnosing 
and interpellating the progressive sectors of society to critically engage in 
a war of position, a struggle for hegemony, in the sense of leadership or 
persuasion. While listening to Flores in a talk he gave at IBERO University 
in Mexico City, I was struck by the highly specific ways in which language 
flowed from the 2017 earthquake, giving, for instance, the name ‘Frida’ both 
to a girl supposedly buried under a collapsed school who was later discovered 
to be non-existent (a perverse media smokescreen?) and to a rescue dog 
that, after helping retrieve dozens of survivors and corpses, appeared in a 
televised football match alongside the triumphant national team and a dozen 
of army soldiers.3 Like the uncanny date coincidence of the two earthquakes, 
these characters made me think of nothing less than Frida Kahlo’s Two Fridas 
painting of 1939 which, according to popular interpretation, depicts her 
heart-breaking divorce from Diego Rivera. ‘Divorce’ was, by the way, one of the 
terms used by Flores at one point to describe the current relationship between 
the Mexican state and the Mexican people, a situation that, he suggested, 
should be transformed through a new ethos of responsible citizenship above 
and beyond melodramatic nationalism.
 Apart from Lexia, very few other voices dared to interrogate the 
overwhelmingly melodramatic and narcissistic register of ‘aid’ on the part 
of socially-networked urbanites, who in the immediate aftermath of the 
earthquake rushed to provide the victims with loads of tins, bottled water, 
diapers and other emblematic products of modern urban life. As it quickly 
became apparent – through social networks as well, which didn’t exist 
in 1985 – that middle class neighbourhoods in Mexico City were being 
disproportionately assisted, privileged urban residents guiltily mobilised to 
re-direct the loads towards more peripheral areas, which in this case included 
multiple and completely destroyed towns in the states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, 
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Tlaxcala, Puebla, Morelos and Veracruz. While the good intentions and the 
‘spontaneous solidarity’ of urban residents cannot be underestimated or 
dismissed, at the time I could not help asking myself about the underlying 
structures, repetitions and disavowals behind the spectacle of solidarity, and 
about my own difficulty at experiencing the 2017 earthquake in a positively 
refreshing way. My listening to the ‘war of narratives’ so entertainingly 
described by Lexia, and to the dominant expressions of ‘solidarity’ within 
my own privileged Facebook bubble, left me with uncomfortable feelings 
of indifference (and boredom) rather than pushing me into warm social 
identification and hope. I asked myself why, and exactly what, I could 
not believe about the whole earthquake experience that could let itself be 
mobilised beyond melancholia towards a more fruitful engagement with 
the infinitely complex situation that ‘Mexico’ signifies today. That question 
inspired my selection of the earthquake and its ‘war of narratives’ aftermath 
as an entry point into the Mexican conjuncture as ‘a strikingly condensed 
and contradictory moment of political struggles, victories, defeats, and 
transformations’.4
 In Mexico, a serious academic is not supposed to write much about 
‘the conjuncture’, a term informally associated with the short-term and the 
opportunistic and implicitly opposed to the elaborate objects and time-tested 
methods of scientific study. Such is the common sense of what counts as serious 
academic work in a neoliberal society in which cultural studies, as Stuart Hall 
understood and practised it, has only recently gained institutional recognition 
as a transdisciplinary field. In other Latin American contexts where cultural 
studies has made important gains in institutional spaces, committed readers 
of Stuart Hall such as Colombian anthropologist Eduardo Restrepo insist that 
the relevance of Hall’s thought in Latin American countries has to do with the 
neoliberalisation of universities, that is, with their transformation into factories 
of quantitatively measured research that is increasingly disconnected from the 
tragic experience of the Latin American majorities.5 The radical contextualism 
of conjunctural analysis, which is connected with the metaphysical desire of 
cultural studies to ‘intervene’, is therefore most valuable today in Latin America.6 
 Jeremy Gilbert has argued that Hall’s approach to the conjuncture – as in 
The Great Moving Right Show7 – remains indispensable to understanding the 
current crisis of technocratic hegemony and of its cultural artefact ‘neoliberal 
cosmopolitanism’, with which the technocrats were able to win the acquiescence 
of ‘the metropolitan left’ in Britain, the US and some European countries.8 
Like Hall’s 1979 essay and Gilbert’s 2017 essay, this contribution seeks to 
question how a certain ‘we’ (in this case an academic ‘we’) is implicated in the 
very phenomenon it attempts to critically investigate, namely, the production 
of hegemony and the current possibilities of destabilising such a production. It 
can be written only from an experience of a sudden crisis, a seismic experience 
which at the time of writing –months before the election of Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador – did yet not look like a new conjuncture to me. 
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 In my view, Hall’s early analysis in The Great Moving Right Show of how the 
British right harnessed residual and emergent feelings in order to rearticulate 
old social forms into a new balance of forces can indeed be ‘applied’ to Mexican 
neoliberalism in the last two decades of the twentieth century. However, rather 
than a positive characterisation of a new conjuncture, what I offer first is a 
reflection on disjuncture, a separation or a profound disconnection between 
academia, a state-sanctioned place for successful individuals, and the people, 
an anonymous collective engaged in diverse tactics and strategies for survival 
in conflict with what they see as a criminal state. In other words, I propose to 
think through ‘this conjuncture’ not in terms of an analytic or a method to 
be mechanically applied to Mexican cultural politics, but rather in terms of 
Stuart Hall’s enduring commitment to specificity and contingency, to radical 
contextualisation and self-reflective engagement with change. 
THE MEXICAN DISJUNCTURE
Our country is not and has never been a democratic-constitutionalist 
country. Here, patriarchy is rampant, there are all kinds of discrimination, 
and justice has always been difficult to achieve. Yet for historical reasons 
it was possible in Mexico to construct, between 1945 and 1976, a semi-
Fordist capitalism overseen by a state so strong and autonomous that 
for many years we called it ‘the perfect dictatorship’. For decades, the 
Mexican political classes were able to sustain an alliance with the popular 
classes, and to establish a capitalist regime still based on persons rather 
than things, with a great potential for industrialisation and a six per cent 
annual rate of economic growth. That precarious alliance, along with a 
good part of the Mexican social tissue, was swept away by neoliberalism.9 
 
There are, according to cultural historian Arthur Schmidt, two main 
interpretations of Mexico’s transition from an economic model of import-
substitution industrialisation (1940-1982) to neoliberalism (1982-present).10 
The once dominant ‘Revolution to Evolution’ interpretation is a narrative 
of progress that represents Mexico’s economic development as the ultimate 
success of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1921), a civil war that overthrew a 
liberal dictatorship and replaced it with the 70-year rule by the authoritarian 
Party of the Institutionalised Revolution (PRI). An alternative ‘Revolution 
to Demolition’ interpretation emerged in the seventies that read Mexico’s 
cooperation with US-style ‘development’ formulae as an economic betrayal 
of revolutionary ideals, i.e. land and freedom. Such an alternative narrative 
has struggled for hegemony by means of social mobilisation and academic 
activism against neoliberalism, as illustrated by the above testimony of 
environmental scientist Raúl García Barrios before the Mexican chapter of the 
Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal (PPT).11 Contemporary cultural historians of the 
Mexican nation tend to agree with this ‘Revolution to Demolition’ narrative, 
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while attempting to rectify its economistic tendencies and their related 
underestimation of popular agency within capitalism – an example of which 
would be the state’s revalorisation of indigenous cultures for the purposes 
of nation-building.12 Within Mexico, however, the cultural and political 
dynamics of neoliberalism has received little academic attention compared 
with the violence and the effects of its imposition as an economic regime. 
By contrast, political scientists such as Gavin O’Toole point out that a purely 
economic understanding of neoliberalism in Mexico downplays the complex 
discursive challenges confronted by Mexican neoliberals as they dismantled 
a political economy legitimised by a potent nationalist tradition.13 Because 
revolutionary nationalism – the ‘Revolution to Evolution’ narrative – had been 
very effective in creating consensus, neoliberals tried to reconcile nationalism 
with the neoliberal project by explaining and interpreting globalisation in 
a certain way.14 Full entry into global competition was asserted as essential 
for national survival. Mexico would at last fulfill its revolutionary vision of 
progress by becoming strongly competitive in a global economy.
 In fact, Mexico was one the first countries to endure the economic policies 
imposed globally by international financial institutions since the end of the 
seventies. Following a decade of economic crisis and structural adjustment 
prescriptions, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into 
effect on 1 January, 1994, and became the first experiment in the world with 
unconditional guarantees for capital investment. Through NAFTA, a relatively 
powerful manufacturing sector was abruptly replaced with aggressive processes 
of re-industrialisation, in which assembly operations (maquiladoras) were 
articulated with a transnational economy rather than fulfilling domestic needs. 
Food sovereignty was displaced by food imports as subsistence agriculture 
was replaced with an environmentally destructive export-oriented agriculture 
catering to the tastes of the US market. Rural support programmes, social 
programmes in general and the juridical order that sustained them were 
almost completely dismantled, starting with the constitutional articles that 
used to protect collective ownership of land (ejidos). To this day, collective 
owners still holding land are actively resisting the temptation to individualise 
land titles, yet forced privatisation (land theft) is progressing primarily in 
central Mexico, and is subordinating land use throughout the country to 
the interests of strategic new industrial corridors built between the eastern 
United States and the Pacific basin. Resource extraction by Mexican companies 
has legally expanded from oil to gas, shale gas, wind and solar energy, 
intensified mining and highly destructive hydrological extraction led by US 
oil and gas companies, Spanish electricity companies and Canadian mining 
companies, all of them supplying the US market. Increasingly deprived, by 
legal and illegal means, of a subsistence economy that has pushed at least 
15.2 million Mexicans to emigrate, an oversupply of labour keeps Mexican 
wages among the lowest in the world. Especially since the 2006 onset of the 
‘war on drugs’, those left behind have become increasingly vulnerable to all 
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kinds of violence, in a situation in which ranks of the criminal economy are 
increasingly indistinct from the ranks of the police, the navy and the army. 
While it became difficult to describe life in contemporary Mexico in terms 
other than loss – of a national project, of identity and of the state – one can 
more accurately describe what actually happened as a positive transformation 
of the state into a facilitator of corporate pillage. In the words of ANAA’s 
lawyer Raymundo Espinoza, as the neoliberal state ‘has bothered to legalise 
the violations of the rights of the people, they have recognised and guaranteed 
the privileges and private interests of a few against the public interest, going 
as far as ignoring the minimal conditions for the reproduction of social life’.15
 It seems indeed very difficult to address the extreme scenarios of postcolonial 
nations in terms of ideology and cultural practices as opposed to straightforward 
economic determinations and direct violence, and yet I suggest that ‘we’ must 
try. According to anthropologist and historian of Mexican nationalism Claudio 
Lomnitz, the depth and speed of transformation in the last three decades means 
that we Mexicans no longer know who we are.16 We no longer inhabit, as in the 
eighties, an economic crisis that may be fixed by international loans, free trade 
and ‘a democratic transition’, but rather we are lost in a crisis of representation 
that expresses itself as a profound disconnection between society and its systems 
of political and media representation. 
 Throughout his recent collection of essays, La nación desdibujada, Lomnitz 
points to the more immediate political causes, namely, a failure of the 
‘democratic transition’ that accompanied neoliberalism as its friendly face. 
Between 2000 – the year that marked the end of one-party rule – and 2014, 
Mexican states received more money from decentralisation policies than 
Europe received from the Marshall Plan. That money, which came straight 
from oil revenues rather than taxes, did not prevent or at least temporarily 
contain the devastating effects of free trade because no corruption control 
mechanisms were in place. Thus, Mexico saw the emergence of a millionaire 
political class with no sense of accountability. In the face of multiplying 
corruption scandals, competition among available political narratives – 
Anglo-style liberalism versus Catholic conservatism, the rule of law versus the 
family-based organic community –no longer describes the social processes 
that accompany the transnationalisation of the Mexican economy. In this 
particular sense, the current situation is for Lomnitz what I think of as a 
disjuncture, or a disconnection between Mexican political rituals and the 
material realities of Mexican subjects. Meanwhile, and not unlike the Marxism 
with guarantees that Stuart Hall was critical of, the Mexican left, Lomnitz 
observes, has so far been prone to an underestimation of the scale and the 
nature of social and cultural change undergone by Mexican society over three 
decades of ‘free trade’. Difficult as it still may be for the Mexican traditional 
left to acknowledge the cultural dimension of neoliberalism, individualistic 
consumerism and global popular culture continue to be influential factors 
in attaining the acquiescence a growing urban population of Mexicans.17 
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What to do, at present, with the undeniable cultural force of globalisation, is 
certainly at stake in the environmental conjuncture.
 In Lomnitz’s view, the traditional invocation by the Mexican left of an 
authentic culture based on an indigenous essence and diametrically opposed 
to foreign interests is a fantasy as much as the conservative family ideal is a 
fantasy in a situation profoundly determined by global economic and knowledge 
flows. In spite of the conservative backlash of a movement such as the Front 
in Defence of the Family – a conservative movement that fears ‘the end of 
Mexico’ will result from gay marriage, abortion and contraception – Mexico is 
no longer culturally owned by the right.18 Class-based discrimination, sexism 
and racism still operate in institutionalised forms in Mexico, yet the critique 
of those forms of oppression is becoming louder and more visible than ever, 
while the traditional narratives of the Mexican nation no longer provide a viable 
political alternative for a country that nowadays exports more manufactured 
goods than Latin America as a whole, and that is more economically integrated 
with the United States than any single European country is integrated with 
the European Community. Hence, a false discussion of cultural essences must 
give way, Lomnitz argues, to a real discussion of existential possibilities on a 
daily basis. His argument, throughout La nación desdibujada, suggests to me 
that under the pressure of a massified violence, a moral transformation is 
going on, which seems to make this the most appropriate time to raise again 
the founding questions of cultural studies.
THE STATE DID IT
The 1968 Mexican student movement inaugurated the possibility of cultural 
and political democratisation, and its bloody repression by the Mexican state 
brought about a long-lasting alliance between the intellectual middle classes 
and the popular demand for political participation. In order to erode this 
alliance throughout the seventies the PRI – the ‘Party of the Institutionalised 
Revolution’ –which became synonymous with ‘the State’ in Mexican parlance 
–combined a ‘dirty war’ strategy against political dissidents with a neo-
nationalist rhetoric aimed at domesticating the middle classes. An expansion 
of university infrastructure, research stimuli, and state sponsorship of culture 
backed the neo-nationalist rhetoric, while the growth of cities became the 
stage for new social movements to acquire concrete organisational forms in 
the poorest neighbourhoods. The ‘urban-popular movement’ of Mexico City, 
for instance, started in the mid-seventies when landless farmers, construction 
workers and other people who earned less than the minimum wage set up 
assemblies and autonomous networks of social care; in different ways they 
provided themselves with education, water supply, security, green spaces, 
health and territorial defence against government-backed urban developers. 
Cultural critic Carlos Monsiváis observes that these forms of organisation did 
not initially create structured proposals for a new society.19 For many years, they 
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refused articulation, and frequently paid for it with internal fracturing and 
dilution. Things changed, however, on 19 September 1985, when a massive 
earthquake materialised the social belief that the Mexican citizenry would do 
better than the Mexican state in rescuing survivors and burying the dead, in 
caring for each other and reconstructing a destroyed city. 
 Only three years after the earthquake came the neoliberal effort to 
attune the energies of ‘civil society’ to the project of ‘joining the First World’. 
Besides signing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) gave the name of ‘National 
Programme of Solidarity’ to social reforms that substituted individualising, 
cash-based, media-enhanced ‘participation’ in the national economy for 
state responsibility and collective duties to universal care. The Zapatista 
rebellion, which made its international appearance on the same day of 
NAFTA’s inception, promptly denounced the destructive consequences 
of such measures, not to mention their deep roots in colonial history. Yet, 
and despite the virtually instantaneous global success of Zapatismo as a 
counterhegemonic narrative of humanity, three decades of free trade have 
led Mexico, quite inexorably, from economic destruction to violent social 
decomposition and unimaginable environmental devastation, as I started 
recounting in the previous section. Such is the context in which Mexican 
social movements position themselves radically against ‘the State’.20
 On 26 September 2014, the abduction of forty-three students from the 
rural teachers’ school of Ayotzinapa, in the state of Guerrero sparked the 
massive outcry and mobilisation of a wide spectrum of Mexican society.21 In 
the following weeks, after a government official pronounced as a ‘historical 
truth’ that the students had been murdered by narcotraffickers and their burnt 
remains had been thrown down a river, thousands of Mexicans took to the 
streets shouting the accusation that the real culprit of the forced disappearance 
had been the Mexican state. In Lomnitz’s diagnosis, Ayotzinapa signalled a 
crisis deeper than 1968 or 1994.22 At any other time the historic link between 
the students of Ayotzinapa and the guerrilla movements of the seventies 
would have facilitated their criminalisation and the justification of their 
forced disappearance. But after eight years of massive bloodshed all too easily 
attributed to a national story of police and thieves – which in many regions 
were in fact heavily-armed marines and narcogangsters – the Mexican state’s 
readiness to close down the Ayotzinapa case led to an irreversible public 
recognition the structural nature of the violence in Mexico. Such a banalising 
attitude on the face of tens of thousands of relatives of disappeared persons 
also exposed the psychological disjuncture in which ‘the war on drugs’ has 
installed the nation: the fact that ‘we’ no longer recognise ourselves as we go 
about our daily business on top of massive clandestine graves. Thus, unlike 
the student movement of 1968 and of the Zapatista insurgency of 1994, the 
social protest against the state’s handling of the Ayotzinapa case gained the 
support of all the social classes.
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 One evening in October 2014, I found myself in the Ayotzinapa protests 
in Mexico City. I was standing with my partner on the Zócalo, in the large 
main public square of Mexico City, in the middle of a crowd of thousands 
overseen by drones and helicopters. As we dispersed, big men on motorcycles 
looked menacingly at us from all four corners of the Zócalo; they seemed 
to be taking photographs and videos. The memory of 1968, and the fear of 
state repression, could be felt in the air. Another evening as I walked home, 
which at the time was only a few blocks away from the Zócalo, I got caught in 
a tight, agitated crowd. Suddenly, the relatives and friends of the disappeared 
students of Ayotzinapa appeared before my eyes. They were leaving the 
Zócalo and held hands, forming a circle of protection around the parents, as 
they advanced through the crowd. One of them was screaming so powerfully 
–‘Ayotzi vive, la lucha sigue’ – that the windows of the surrounding buildings 
seemed about to shatter. I will never forget the vibrations of that scream, nor 
how from that same corner of the Zócalo I also witnessed, some days earlier 
or later, the symbolic end of a historic political career, that of Cuauhtémoc 
Cárdenas. Back in 1988 I had accompanied my mother to the voting booths, 
and had indiscreetly announced to everybody that we were there to vote for 
Cuauhtémoc. This candidate was the son of Lázaro Cárdenas, Mexico’s figure 
of revolutionary nationalism who had expropriated oil companies in 1936. He 
was one of the founders of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and 
did not win the presidential election, but remained the moral leader of the 
reformist left. Three decades later, in 2014, after one of the massive protests 
against corruption and impunity, a crowd violently insulted and threw food 
at Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas.23 Some of the direct perpetrators of the Ayotzinapa 
disappearance had been PRD representatives in the state of Guerrero. The 
PRD and, with it, the whole party system, was forever discredited. 
 According to Lomnitz, among others, Ayotzinapa made it evident that 
Mexico has nothing – no functional institutions – but massive grassroots 
mobilisation and repudiation as a means to reclaim justice. In his view, the 
number of missing persons in Mexico, which is unknown but is estimated 
as tens of thousands, guarantees a continuing demand for justice through 
organised and better-communicated relatives. The question is now whether 
those people, most of which belong to very vulnerable sectors of the Mexican 
majority, will be able to renovate the political apparatus from outside of 
the rotten party system. Since 2006, the magnitude of the Mexican tragedy 
has seen a splintering of Zapatismo and social movements more generally, 
between sectors demanding radical autonomy from a criminal state and other 
sectors more open to striking alliances with the less illegitimate forces in the 
Mexican political class.24
 In July 2018 a representative of the autonomous National Indigenous 
Congress, María de Jesús Patricio Martínez (Marichuy) competed for the 
electorate’s attention with the presidential candidate (now president elect) 
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did not succeed in earning enough votes to become an independent candidate 
in the presidential race, but her stated purpose was not to win such an 
independent candidacy. Rather, it was to express an increasing distancing 
from traditional politics on the grounds of an increasing frequency and 
violence of the attacks indigenous peoples are being subjected to on the 
part of criminals and paramilitaries often employed by extractive companies 
protected by the state.25 Meanwhile AMLO gained traction and ultimately won 
the election by striking alliances with religious and corporate sectors. At least 
he will stop the killing, some seemed to think, by changing the government’s 
strategy against narco-violence. Soon after his election, however, AMLO 
started rectifying over what had seemed like the most decisive of promises 
that led him to victory.26 At any rate, his election also seems to confirm 
Lomnitz’s appreciation of cultural and political change in Mexican society 
as a result of three decades of neoliberal globalisation, precipitated by the 
spiral of uncontainable violence that has devastated the country for the last 
ten to twelve years. In the following section I examine the role of grassroots 
environmental politics in such a process of change, and I argue that not only 
are grassroots socioenvironmental struggles crucial to the future – if there 
is any – of Mexican democracy, but also that the environmental conjuncture 
calls for a reflection, on the part of contemporary cultural struggles, that 
goes far deeper than strategic analysis, into the philosophical infrastructure 
of cultural and political narratives in Latin America and the globalised West.
THEY WANTED TO BURY US: THEY DID NOT KNOW THAT WE 
WERE SEEDS
Problems accumulate until they become institutions of a sponsored 
apocalypse. Ideas developed in other countries (the thesis of planetary 
unity, ecospirituality, the idea of the Earth as an organism that must be 
respected as a whole) are minimised or ignored in Mexico, and nuclear 
disasters such as Three Miles Island and Chernobyl barely resonate in 
Latin America. The distance from planetary commitments is the ultimate 
tribute to isolationism. So how do you persuade people to become involved 
at some level with the environment?27
 
Cultural critic Carlos Monsiváis described the foreign quality of environmental 
sensibilities in Mexican cultural politics. Whereas the developmental 
imaginaries of the postwar period in Latin America had little to say about 
planetary limits, neoliberal extractivism and its speculative management 
of environmental disaster came to reinforce the marginality of ecological 
education, discussion and action in mainstream Mexican society: the one 
that lives in cities, has access to public and private services, and is attuned 
to global media. A symptom of this was the 1993 emergence of the ‘Green 
Ecological Party of Mexico’ or Partido Verde Ecologista de México (PVM), which 
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is best described as a family-run business that attaches the word ‘green’ to any 
number of rightwing causes including the death penalty, and is well-known 
for its opportunistic involvement in straightforward ecocide through, for 
example, the development of tourist resorts in highly fragile coastal areas.28 
The fact that, despite having been explicitly rejected by green organisations 
at the international level, PVM continues to exist and to do violence to the 
language of ecology is a good introduction to the environmental aspect of 
the Mexican disjuncture. But it is also just one side of the story; the other side 
must be searched for as one searches for the disappeared. Indeed, Mexican 
green politics must be placed in the context of the extreme difficulties posed 
by state violence which, as Monsiváis also often emphasised, has conditioned 
the seeming political apathy of mainstream Mexican society. What I want 
to argue now is that the environmental dimension of structural violence in 
Mexico has its own as yet unacknowledged role in a political crisis that might 
have led to an emerging ‘conjuncture’ marked by the electoral triumph of 
Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO).29 With this hypothesis in mind I 
look in this section at the work of articulation undertaken by some of the 
legatees of 1968, 1985 and 1994. 
 Since the seventies the field of political ecology has been linking a minority 
of Mexican scientists to rural and urban grassroots movements. A longstanding 
and influential voice in that field, Víctor Toledo argues in his recent collection 
of essays, Ecocidio en México, that the neoliberal destruction of Mexico signals 
‘the terminal phase of industrial civilisation and its individual, social and 
ecological contradictions’.30 The entire world is going through a civilisational 
crisis that demands, in Toledo’s view, the global reconfiguration of the modern 
way of life, a radical change of scientific paradigms, and the invention of new 
ways of interpreting and analysing reality. Like a good utopian radical and a 
representative of the communitarian left alluded to by Lomnitz above, Toledo 
believes in a ‘golden age of the human species’ in which benign collectivities 
thrived all over the world on the basis of cooperation and solidarity. He asserts 
that such a harmony or natural balance was catastrophically interrupted by the 
modern civilisation that is now, he thinks, in its terminal phase. Notwithstanding 
this prophetic and unduly pessimistic tone in Toledo’s discourse, it undeniably 
and positively resonates with so many other anti-capitalist movements in the 
world that aspire to transcend the individualism, rationalism and pragmatism 
of homo oeconomicus in order to construct social power as the only exit from 
planetary collapse. For Toledo such an exit is not, moreover, a philosophical 
issue, but an urgent call for a new scientific praxis, a political ecology that 
restores the link between social care and environmental care. Thus, when he 
writes about recuperating ‘indigenous values’ such as reciprocity and respect 
for nature, he points to the hundreds of really existing cooperatives and local 
initiatives in Mexico that nurture collective wellbeing through non-extractive 
environmental management. When he writes about cultivating complex 
thinking as ‘species consciousness’, he points to the growing networks of 
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concrete struggles, to the increasing articulation of social actions in concrete 
territories to be defended from the criminal state-industrial complex. ‘The final 
battle’, he says, ‘is a battle for life’. In recent years Mexican activists close to or 
sympathetic with Toledo’s utopian vision have performed astonishing political 
interventions that help to imagine and invite to seriously consider an emerging 
environmental conjuncture that starts with an international recognition of the 
dimensions and implications of Mexico’s suffering in the last thirty years.31 
Their story adds another layer of meaning to a phrase often used by those 
who protested, and continue to protest the criminality of the Mexican state, 
namely: ‘they wanted to bury us; they did not know that we were seeds’.
 The Asamblea Nacional de Afectados Ambientales (ANAA) is a nationwide 
network of environmental struggles that took shape between 2006 and 2014. 
It describes itself as a popular and pacific organised response to the global 
environmental crisis, an embodiment of the Mexican people’s increasing 
awareness of environmental devastation, and a living space for the encounter 
of neighbourhoods, towns, communities, organisations and movements that 
for years or even decades have been fighting against degradation, destruction 
and expropriation of their water, air, land, woods, biodiversity, seeds, health 
and conviviality. ANAA’s founder, Andrés Barreda Marín, is a professor of 
Political Economy at Mexico’s National Autonomous University (UNAM) 
and a long-standing left-wing activist with a history of direct participation 
as a political strategist in the Zapatista mobilisation since 1994. In 2006 
Barreda took distance from Zapatista politics and went on to organise 
several independent, grassroots initiatives of environmental monitoring 
(focusing especially on water pollution and privatisation in Central Mexico) 
and popular education. In 2007, he founded both the National Assembly 
of the Environmentally Affected and, together with genetic scientist Elena 
Álvarez-Buylla, the Union of Concerned Scientists of Mexico (UCCS). 
ANAA and UCCS have collaborated in several ways throughout the years 
on a variety of environmental issues, first and foremost on the risk posed by 
GMOs to Mexican agriculture and biodiversity. While this has become the 
UCCS’s signature issue, ANAA has developed into a thematically complex 
and comprehensive network of regional, national and international alliances. 
The point, Barreda said to me in interview, is not to become yet another 
thematic NGO but rather to act as an articulator and a trend-setter in the social 
movement scene. That is, ‘the environment’ is for ANAA not a single topic to 
be informing about, but rather it is a matter of placing socioenvironmental 
awareness firmly on the agenda of Mexican and Latin American social 
movements.32 
 According to Barreda ANAA’s aim regarding an environmental 
consciousness has involved extremely hard work. In Latin America, he 
observes, ‘the social debt chokes the environmental debt’. ANAA has had 
to ‘break’ multiple forms of isolation related to the social debt, which keeps 
struggles apart from and ignorant of each other. There is geographic isolation, 
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since Mexico is huge and the environmentally affected are territorially 
dispersed, culturally diverse and often do not have resources for travelling and 
communication. There is conceptual isolation of environmental issues from 
social and political issues. ANAA intervenes through popular education, and 
it is hard to describe the amount of time and energy that popular education 
involves in a country as large, diverse and socially indebted as Mexico. Finally, 
and most important for my focus in this article, there is the isolation between 
academic knowledge producers and the impoverished majorities outside 
academia, the latter being people whose knowledges are systematically 
undervalued (and policed) by mainstream society. ANAA conceptualises itself 
as a strategy for breaking all these forms isolation, for allowing people to 
encounter one another and thereby discover, by themselves, that everything 
is interconnected.
 Unlike the political ecologist Toledo, the political economist Barreda does 
not believe that capitalism is going to end. As an experienced strategist, he 
cautions against overestimating the forces of vulnerable groups, and against 
fostering unrealistic expectations. Rather, he advises strengthening and 
articulating concrete struggles on the basis on what the people themselves can 
actually do within their own contexts. The first gathering of ANAA in 2007 
was improvised, an appendix to other mobilisations in Mexico City, and its 
memoir – which is found among many other documents in ANAA’s website 
highlights the lack of a collective perception of the country’s environmental 
collapse.33 The relatively few people who took part in it, however, started 
seeing links among their struggles and drew the first lines of environmental 
solidarity between the country and the city, as well as among the diverse 
regions of the country. A communication strategy was key, they realised, 
in order to make ANAA grow. After three more gatherings in 2008, the 
Assembly started to describe itself as the qualitative project of placing human-
nature relationships on the agenda of national problems. Environmental 
management, the Assembly agreed, should be designed by ‘the communities 
themselves’, which needed a space to reflect together around key problematics: 
a) the centrality of biodiversity to the global process of accumulation; b) the 
political nature of environmental management; c) the debate around legality 
and institutions; d) the expressions of the global at the microsocial level; e) 
the problems faced by the communities as they establish their own relations 
with nature.
 ANAA has evolved into a national space for the political education and 
interlocution of the environmentally affected throughout Mexico. Until 
2014, it offered a series of workshops to all its members, literally thousands 
of communities from all over the republic, which were designed to share and 
multiply successful strategies in a horizontal manner. One of those workshops 
invited people to reflect around the connections between environmental 
devastation and the crisis of health, and to explore autonomous courses of 
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to ‘toxitours’, while medical and scientific professionals accompanied the 
workshops and contributed to promoting organic food networks, developing 
water and garbage treatment processes, exchanging native seeds, and so 
forth. Another workshop, titled ‘The new green capitalism’, was intended 
to warn the communities about the governmental drive to make money out 
of climate crisis, as opposed to stopping environmental devastation. The 
point was to get them prepared for new environmental policies that had 
been operating in isolated fashion but, the ANAA foresaw, would become 
integrated into ‘an aggressive totality against the survival of our communities 
and our ecosystems (geoengineering, privatisation of environmental 
services, biological corridors, intellectual property, REDD+, etc.)’.34 Finally, 
there was a workshop against juridical naiveté, based on the fact that social 
movements often make political mistakes that invite state repression and 
send them into burnout. By 2010, and having by its sixth edition gathered 
500 community representatives, ninety organisations and 1,135 visitors from 
several Mexican states, the Assembly had made a clear connection between 
concrete environmental problems and the politics of free trade. Case by case, 
ANAA constructed a vision of systematic violations of the law on the part of 
the State and the transnational companies, and concluded that the situation 
could not be tackled by denouncing individual cases, since there is a crisis of 
the rule of law which means literally that the law is against the people. On 
the basis of this position, ANAA became the main promoter of the Mexican 
chapter of the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal (PPT), an international human 
rights tribunal founded in Italy in 1979.35 
 According to Barreda, the Mexican chapter of the PPT started as early 
as 2009 with his own search for at least fifty organisations and activist 
personalities that could be interested in collaboratively writing the petitions 
that would be required once the Mexican chapter was admitted by in Rome. 
Not without much insistence on the part of Barreda and his collaborators, 
Rome accepted the chapter in 2011, by which time almost 300 organisations 
had joined the project. The process began then with the presentation of 
charges against the state at a public session on 21 October, 2011 at UNAM 
and continued through seven thematic and three multi-thematic hearings 
systematically exploring the complex, dramatic spectrum of violations of the 
fundamental rights of peoples which have occurred throughout the specific 
period examined in the PPT proceedings: 1982-2014. In the Mexican chapter 
as in other chapters of the PPT, thousands of documents were reviewed and 
thousands of witness statements were presented, resulting in a sentence 
that accuses all levels of the Mexican State apparatus of committing ‘abuse 
of power’ against the Mexican population in collusion with transnational 
capital, the policies of the United States of America and even with the 
operation and interests of a large number of criminal organisations. A total 
of 211 complaints were made to the PPT relating to environmental issues, 
but similar numbers were achieved by other ‘thematic sections’: ‘dirty war’, 
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migration, femicides, labour rights, violence against communicators, and 
environmental devastation. Rather than summarising each thematic sections 
– which would be impossible in an article like this –I want to draw attention to 
particular sections of the final verdict of the PPT, those in which the tribunal 
highlights a ‘striking disconnection’ between Mexico’s image abroad and 
the actual horrors that the Mexican people have been going through since 
1994, and increasingly since 2006.36 The authors of the verdict underscore 
how enormously challenging it is to understand the scale of violence against 
Mexicans. Partly due to Mexico’s diplomatic history of welcoming refugees, 
refusing to support armed intervention in other countries, and ratifying all 
kinds of international human rights agreements, the world lives in ‘shocking 
ignorance’ about the routine use of extreme forms of violence (murder, forced 
disappearance, torture) against those in Mexico who resist neoliberal state 
policies, particularly on the environmental front. Hence, the sentence reads, 
‘the world must be told that the Mexican Government has a sunny face for 
the outside world and another one at home’. 
 In the decade following the 1968 student massacre in Tlatelolco, Mexico 
City, state violence had political opposition as its main target, and the most 
radical forces were concentrated in rural states of the country such as Chiapas 
and Guerrero – home of student leader and guerrilla fighter Lucio Cabañas, 
who trained at the teachers’ school of Ayotzinapa. Throughout the seventies 
the policing strategy was counterinsurgency led by paramilitaries. Today, 
however, as the PPT points out, direct violence is exerted on a massive scale, 
and policing operates more than ever at the level of representation. What 
in previous decades happened in other Latin American countries – the 
silence and the denial of forced disappearances and unexplained murders 
– has been spreading in Mexico and has become a mechanism of enforced 
passivity. The crisis of representation that Lomnitz diagnoses and that the 
PPT documents materialises in the fact that ‘there are no reliable records, 
no information about the data which refer to more than a million people 
internally displaced, nor proper treatment of victims, their testimonies or the 
situation their allegations reveal’. The existence of tight information control 
through direct violence (abduction, torture, murder) and indirect violence 
(threats, fear, impunity) make the PPT conclude that the Mexican government 
is thoroughly implicated in multiple cases and that, as Lomnitz also argues:
 
It has fallen to countless Mexican social movements to shoulder the 
burden not only of the many forms of suffering described in the tribunal’s 
proceedings, but also the difficult task of drawing back the cloak of silence 
and forgetting which surrounds the present situation, of documenting, 
classifying, analysing and also understanding the enormity, complexity 
and gravity of the State crimes carried out in Mexico between 1982 and 
2014, and tracing their origins back to earlier massacres and processes 
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performed alone, faced with the silence and indifference of international 
institutions, most governments, the vast majority of international and 
national media and even most grassroots organisations in other countries, 
has nevertheless been turned into an enriching space thanks to its capacity 
to coordinate social movements.
 
These were the seeds that the Mexican state buried, and they were cared for by 
the National Assembly of the Environmentally Affected. By the Final Hearing 
of the PPT, in 2014, and only a few weeks after the events of Ayotzinapa, the 
number of organisations involved in the trials had risen to 2356. While the 
PPT has no power to translate its rulings into practical punitive decisions, 
it derives its legitimacy from its ability to guarantee effective representation 
for ‘peoples’ orphaned of their rights and victims lacking any hope of 
recognition or remedy. The effects of such a representation and recognition 
should not be underestimated, and they should instead be acknowledged as 
a testimony of the social capacity, even in the most extreme circumstances, 
to break isolation and mobilise through solidarity. The Mexican organisers 
took as their direct inspiration the Colombian chapter of the PPT, which is 
important, Barreda writes in the Spanish version of the Final Hearing, because 
the Colombian chapter made the process itself, rather than its results, its 
main goal. He explains:
...it was certainly in the process of listening to each other that we repeatedly 
found the opportunity of an encounter, or a new encounter, among all 
kinds of organisations and all kinds of purposes. It was there that we had 
the chance of breaking the moulds, the sectarisms and atavic prejudices, 
that isolated our territorially dispersed resistances, clearing the way for 
us to set about reconstructing our communitarian tissues. And it has been 
in this process that we have put on the table new opportunities for critical 
reflection and for a profound re-organisation of our society.37 
Although Barreda is a Marxist scientist that actively refuses to talk about 
‘culture’ – too complex an issue, he told me in interview – a New Leftish streak 
shows through after all in his appreciation of ANAA’s success with the PPT. 
He describes ANAA’s strategy in very subtle aesthetic terms as the invention 
of a more virtuous relationship between academia and the people outside 
academia, in a context where mistrust and mutual suspicion tend to prevail. 
By attacking the disjuncture, in this case the isolation between potentially 
progressive social forces, ANAA created something that rarely sees the chance 
to emerge in neoliberalised universities. Indeed, one cannot underestimate 
the subjective effects, at the community level, of getting organised to do 
research on what actually happens to ‘us’ and to present it formally to 
professional researchers who seriously listen. For the academics involved in 
such a process it means the opportunity of understanding how much their 
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commitment is needed in the current social and environmental catastrophe. 
I would therefore like to suggest that ANAA’s story may be signaling the 
emergence of an environmental conjuncture not only in the sense of pushing 
for a centrality or hierarchy of environmental issues in the political agenda, 
but in the sense of a radical displacement of the framework that isolates 
environmental issues from all other issues and deals with them in a purely 
instrumental, representational way. ANAA does not just engage in a ‘war of 
narratives’, but rather it performs an intervention into the very framework that 
reduces politics to a war of narratives. It creates space for thinking something 
else – perhaps through a novel awareness of the material precariousness of 
subject formation – without guarantees. By way of conclusion, I want to suggest 
that rethinking cultural studies in Latin America through the de-essentialising 
work of infrapolitical deconstruction may radicalise an engagement with the 
environmental conjuncture, including cultural and political phenomena such 
as the National Assembly of the Environmentally Affected (ANAA). 
ENVIRONMENTAL POSTHEGEMONY: ARTICULATION IN 
DECONSTRUCTION
In 2011, Hall wrote that ‘the present situation is a crisis, another unresolved 
rupture of that conjuncture which we can define as the long march of the 
neoliberal revolution’.38 He seemed to recognise that conjunctural analysis 
may have been, since the seventies, barely scratching the surface of that 
‘chaotic abstraction’ which goes by the name of neoliberalism and that each 
time must be rendered concrete, given content, focus and a cutting edge 
through radically specific accounts from across the geopolitical spectrum. 
The magnitude of Mexico’s socioenvironmental crisis can be only faintly 
symbolised by last year’s earthquake and its narrative outpouring. Yet the 
earthquake can also be read as the prefiguration of a partial rearrangement, a 
crack through which grassroots voices may finally enter a phase of hegemonic 
struggle while, at the same time calling into question the framework of 
hegemony as such. As Gareth Williams suggests:
The modern nomos has entered into a state of collapse and we are 
living times of total economic mobilisation and spatial de-structuration 
characterised by the ultra-violence of narco-accumulation and the 
rampant extraction of resources not only in Latin America –in which the 
so-called leftist governments of the marea rosada have been key players 
too, of course –but in any space virtually anywhere on the planet deemed 
available for extraction and value. This is the time of spatial and political 
de-containment, and posthegemony is the sign and diagnosis of its 
peculiar, post-developmentalist epochality.39
Posthegemony, Williams explains, is the question of time and of ‘our’ time. 
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In his critical account of the history of subalternism in Latin America, he 
presents Latin Americanists with two main options. Either we stay with a 
‘passive acceptance of the laws of the given [by] conceiving of the political as 
reformist shifts in pre-existing social policy and systems of representation,’ 
or we undertake a ‘detour’ away from ‘positive reflection’ ‘in the name of 
an alternative interpretative regime for the thinking of the political (p80)’. 
The latter option is posthegemony, which emerged in the early 2000s as ‘a 
democratic thought and practice that sought to deconstruct the determination 
of the political in the name of freedom’ (p90). In my reading of Williams’s 
argument, posthegemony is no capricious libertarianism, but a distinctively 
self-reflective response to globalisation understood as a temporal de-
structuration of the modern apparatus of development, an emergent war 
of all against all, and a de-structuration of modern political space. It is a 
rigorous and situated engagement with the disjuncture, the ‘chaotically 
abstract’ deeper layer as well or the philosophical infrastructure of the 
extreme violence of neoliberalism, against which ANAA continues to fight. 
Thus, by contrast with the decolonial variant of Latin American subalternism, 
posthegemony or ‘second-order Latin Americanism’ undertakes a detour from 
‘positive reflection’ so as to effectively perform ‘a deviation or a divergence 
toward a difference from the nihilist world of the technologically given and 
the all-encompassing will to power of the modern subject (p81)’.  Only such 
a deviation, Williams suggests, can materialise the posthegemonic wager 
‘that politics does not have to exhaust itself within a hegemony-subalternity 
relation that always works against the subaltern (p90)’. 
 When in 2006 I started my postgraduate education in London and 
discovered the possibility of translating my humanities background into 
a practice of cultural studies, Stuart Hall’s accounts of the crisis of the 
humanities and the emergence of cultural studies were of the greatest interest 
to me.40 Through their vivid description of uncertainty regarding what was 
going on with the culture, and their lucid acknowledgment of the conflicts 
and hostilities faced by the effort to construct novel theoretical frameworks, 
Hall’s writings constituted a model of thoughtful writing for me.41 Perhaps 
some of his enduring insights – his textual emphasis on the dynamism and 
indetermination of concrete social formations, and his democratic insistence 
on the notion that resistance is a process without guarantees –can be fruitfully 
articulated through the posthegemonic project now called ‘infrapolitical 
deconstruction’.42 A novel articulation would indeed be necessary because 
in the late 1990s, some practitioners of U.S.-based Latin American Studies 
realised that, having been initially useful to them as an escape from disciplinary 
constrictions, the cultural studies paradigm had become unproductive. In 
the context of ‘an intensification of political salvation through academic 
work’, such practitioners came to perceive cultural studies as ‘mechanical 
and dogmatic’ and as an obstacle to the critique of the history of the Latin 
American left (p15). Indeed, through an ascending hegemony of subalternism 
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and decoloniality, Latin American cultural studies seemed to be more invested 
in a repetition of the left’s history than in a reflection on that history’s 
implication in the metaphysical will to power, with its exterminative drive 
(Subalternist turn, p80-81). A refusal of such a repetition started to organise 
under the name of ‘infrapolitics’, or a reflection on existence beyond political 
demand. Infrapolitics, Alberto Moreiras writes, ‘is the impolitical politicity 
that suspends and questions every apparent politicisation, every instance of 
political emergence’ (Infrapolitics, p14). This is also to refuse a politics as a 
closed space, which in the Latin American context may lead to ‘wholly other 
politics whose effective possibility we lose nothing for exploring’. 
 As a radical alternative to policing the environmental conjuncture, a 
rethinking of Hall’s legacy for Latin America through the work of infrapolitics 
may help to open up a singular approach to concrete processes of resistance 
such as the National Assembly of the Environmentally Affected (ANAA). 
As a space for encounter and recognition of society as such, ANAA is 
contributing to reconstitute the definition of society through a real discussion 
of existential possibilities on a daily basis. Yet like infrapolitics, and beyond 
the contemporary emphasis on substantial community, ANAA seems to enact 
a practice of alliance on the materially precarious grounds of radical equality 
rather than abstract filiation, representation, and liberation. I read it thus as 
an inventive practice of becoming with ‘both Indians and non-Indians, that 
is, everyone, and precisely everyone’, since we are all environmentally affected. 
A processual, deconstructively material understanding of environmental 
affectation calls for further inventive interventions which refuse to settle into 
yet another mechanism for representation. In Mexico, the environmental 
conjuncture may thus harbor the invention of a deconstructive kind of cultural 
studies in which strategic analysis of national conjunctures opens up a space 
for radical democratic engagement with the deeper layers and the most 
painful experiences of the planetary disjuncture.
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